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et al.: Damages--Entire or Separable Damages--Basis for Recovery of Entir
WEST VIRGINIA

LAW

QUABTEBLY

adt of the maker in failing to live up to his agreement, and it
would therefore seem to be just that this reasonable expense should
be borne by the party at fault.
For a citation of authorities and a more extended discussion of
the principle involved in this case, see THE BAR,Jan., 1916, 41.
DAMAGES-EINTIRE

OR

SEPARABLE

DAMAGES -BASIS

FOR RE-

CovERY Op ENTIRE DAMAGES.- Under authority of law defendant
city had constructed a municipal incinerating plant on land adjoining the lot occupied by plaintiff as her residence. The jury
found that plaintiff's property was injured by smoke and odors
incident to the operation of the plant, although it was constructed
in the most approved manner and operated with due care and diligence. Held, that entire damages for a permanent injury be
allowed. Keene v. City of Huntington, 91 S. E. 119 (W. Va.
1917).
In order to assess entire damages in cases of this kind, it is
necessary (1) that the structure causing the damage be authorized
by law, City of Kewanee v. Otley, 204 Ill. 402, 68 N. E. 388,. 392,
(2) that there be no negligence either in the contruction or in the
operation of the plant, and (3) that either the damage be permanent or the cause of damage be of reasonably definite continuance.
See 4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES, 4 ed., §§ 1017, 1042; and 3 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES,

9 ed., § 924. All three elements exist in the prin-

cipal case. If the plaintiff's injury had been due to negligeht operation of the plant, City of Denver v. Davis, 37 Colo. 370, 86 Pac.
1027, or had the location been temporary, City of Chattanoogav.
Dowling, 101 Tenn. 342, 47 S. W. 700, only separable damages
could have been recovered. If its maintenance were unauthorized
and it was therefore a nuisance, besides equitable relief, plaintiff
might recover separable damages in successive actions in case to
compel its abatement. Watts v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 39
W. Va. 196, 19 S. E. 521; Rogers v. Coal River Boom & Driving
Co., 39 W. Va. 272, 19 S.E. 401. Since in the principal case it was
authorized by law, there was no possibility for its compulsory abatement and therefore the reason is lacking for successive actions incase -for separable damages to compel abatement. Whether at
his option the plaintiff should be allowed to recover entire damages
which would operate to license its future operation so far as plaintiff's property is concerned is to be questioned. See 4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES, 4 ed., § 1039. Although not so stated in the principal case, it is said in earlier West Virginia cases, Smith v. Pt.
Pleasant & Ohio River Ry. Co., 23 W. Va. 451, 452; Guin et al.
v. Ohio River Co., 46 W. Va. 151, 33 S. E. 87, and in cases in other
jurisdictions, Park Com'r of Louisville v. Donahue, 140 Ky. 502,
131 S. W. 285, 286; Stodghill v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., 53 Ia. 341,
5 N. W. 495, 497; Highland Avenue & B. R. Co. v. Mathews et al.,
99 Ala. 24, 10 So. 267, 269; Fowle v. New Haven & Northampton
Company, 112 Mass. 334, 339, that the granting of entire damages
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is an assessment of "future damages." It is submitted that this
displays a misconception of the foundation for recovery. Though
legally not a nuisance because authorized by law, Spencer v. Pt.
Pleasant & Ohio River Ry. Co., 23 W. Va. 406, 427; Watson v.
Fairmont Ry. Co., 49 W. Va. 528, 540, 39 S. E. 193, still it is
in fact a nuisance which, for reasons of public policy, may not be
abated. Geer v. Durham Water Co., 127 N. C. 349, 37 S. E. 474,
475. The person injured has a right of action for damages suffered
by what is in its nature an exercise of the right of eminent domain to establish a nuisance as an easement over the plaintiff's
property. Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 26 W. Va. 787, 799; City of
Nashville v. Comer, 88 Tenn. 415, 12 S. W. 1027, 1029. The damages awarded are not future damages because: first, as held in the
principal case, the immediate depreciation in the value of the property is damage already suffered; second, future damages are often
in such cases not ascertainable; and, third, since in fact a nuisance,
the rule should hold that damages created by a nuisance are not
recoverable until suffered. See WOOD, NuisAxcEs, 2 ed., 1001;
Luther v. Winnisimmet Go., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 171, 175.

nmES AND MnNGi - Om AND GAS LEASE ALTY ON LEASE BY ADJOn NG LANDOWNERS.-

DIVsON OF RoYOwners of several

adjoining tracts of land leased their tracts jointly as a single parcel for the purpose of producing oil and gas. A producing well
was drilled on the land of the defendant who claimed all of the
royalty. Held, that the total royalty must be divided among all
the lessors in the proportion that the area owned by each bears to
the whole tract. Lynch v. Davis, 92 S. E. 427, (W. Va. 1917).
The principal case differs from the ease of Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. St. 559, 28 Atl. 934. In the latter case a tract was
leased for oil and gas purposes and later devised in three portions
to the lessor's three sons, thus severing the reversion, and it was
held that the royalties should be divided equally among the devisees. In ordinary leases if the reversion is severed the general
rule is that the rent must be apportioned according to the respective value of the parts. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 175;
UNDERmL, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 341. "This rule is not applicable to oil and gas leases, however, since the lessee has a right to
take a part of the realty itself, instead of having the mere use of
the premises as in the ease of an ordinary lessee. Where there has
been a severance of the reversion of an oil and gas lease into two
or more parts, two cases have held that the owner of each part is
entitled to all of the royalty from the mineral produced on his
soil. Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Go. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio St.
259, 67 N. E. 494; Osborn v. Arkansas TerritorialOil and Gas Co.,
103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122.. It would seem that these cases lay
down the correct rule where the conveyance or conveyances which
sever the reversion do not make provision for the division of the
royalty, and such rule was approved by way of dictum in Rymer
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